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Introduction
Ma~y f actoTs prevent commodity trade from equalizing the Tt!Vards to -factors of production in different countries, providing an incentive for factor.movements between countries. ~'bile movements of factors, especially capital, are important in the world economy, they have not been sufficient , · to equate factor returns among countries.
1'he failure of capital flows to equate rates of Teturn on capital is frequently attributed to political risks and left outside the sphere of economic analysis. Specifically, investments abroad, especially in LDC's, are said to be more subject to the Tisk of expropriation, or at least to unpredictable changes in the tax and exchange control Tegime offered by the host country. Williams (1975) estimates that about twenty percent of t~e value of foreign investments carried into or made during 1~56-72 in iDC's was expropriated without compensation in this period. Rather than consigning the study of these phenomena to other disciplines, we argue that an important set of economic considerations affect the nature of these impediments to capital mobility.
In this paper, we provide a theory of expropriation based on maxi~izing J,ehavior by investors and host countries. This theory can be used to identify industry and national characteristics that increase the threat of expropTia-1 tion and imply large deviations from equalized rates of return on capital.
Ve examine host country and parent country policies minimizing the distortions associated with the threat of expropriation.
Three broad conclusions follov from the analysis. First, the threat ·of expropriation implies significant distortions in the international allocation of capital even though the .!£.!_ of eA-propriation may be relatively . ,::;.
...
• -2-rare. For instance, in a world of perfect foresight and rational decisionaaking. acts of expropriation would never occur and yet the actions by investors taken to ensure that countries do not expropriate are distorting.
Second, the ability of governments to e~-propriate foreign investments may actually reduce their own velfare. Further, the hosts may be better off if investor country govetnments can retaliate against expropriating countries. Indeed, the higher this penalty. the more their welfare may be increased. This conclusion arises because a government's power to expropriate after investments are made leads investors to restrict their investaents beforehand in a vay that makes the host country worse off than it would be if it could not expropriate, yieldi:lg an example of the general paradox of time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) .
; .
Third, domestic factor prices may not a:curately reflec~ social returns vhen the threat of expropriation affects the supply of foreign investment.
The social rate of return on capital may-exceed its domestic marginal product while the social rate of retutn on any factor supplied by foreigners and 1lOt exproprisble may be less than the marginal product of that factor. This result has ilnplications for project evaluation in LDC's.
In Section 2 ve present a simple mo&el of foreign investment with potential exprcpriation based on MacDougall 's (1958) work on foreign investaent in the absence of expropriation.·. A small country produces a single output vith three factors. Labor is supplied domestically in a fixed amount and is not internationally mobile. Two.other factors, capital and management, are internationally mobile. These tvo factors differ in that capital can be expropriated; management cannot be. For our purposes, capital represents the tangible aspects of foreign investment: plant, equipment, inventories and .
•3-other properties left behind after expropriation. Managerial services are £lie intangible assets that a foreign investor brings to the pro~uction process:. technical kno~ledge, organizational capabilities, access to over-..
•eas markets and the like. Essential to our analysis is the assumption that if expropriation occurs, the managerial services of the foreign investor are llo longer available and cannot be replaced by other foreigners. This / situation may arise because foreign managers boycott the expropriating country or because the capital installed by foreign investors is specific to its own managerial skills. !! post the finn' s managers may have a unique ability to operate that firm's capital.
• .. ln deciding on expropriation, a host country must weigh the benefits of obtaining inco~e from foreign capital and the .ov."'Ilership of the capital itself against the costs of losing access to foreign managerial services.
!'or many levels of foreign investment, including the one equating the domestic marginal product cf capital to the world interest rate, the bencf its cf expropriation mav out~eigh the costs. Foreign investors will not increase their investments to the point where expropriation becomes optimal. lf the threat of expropriation is binding, the level of foreign investment and national income will be determined by competition among investors and the capacity of the host country to absorb foreign investment without expropriation. ln Section 2 we examine the detenninants of this equilibrium and the effects of changes in .national factor endO\omlents and world factor prices on this equilibrium. ~e also investigate the effects of the threat of 
:
In Section 6 we return to the assumption that investors are competitive 'ut assume thnt projects are risky and that expropriation transfers this risk to the host country. Risk bearing rather than managerial skill is the contribution of foreign investors that cannot be expropriated. A host can l>enefit from increases in the riskiness of projects if it is risk averse while foreign investors are not, since. risk reduces the threat of expropriation.
In Section 6 we assume that the risk. inherent in foreign investment is : 1lOt resolved until after the expropriation decision must be made. This assumption is appropriate to projects where the risk is ongoing. e.g., -•-, agricultural projects subject to annual differences in weather or projects producing output sold in volatile international markets. For ot~er types of projects, uncertainty is resolved before the expropriation decision must be made. This situation may prevail in extractive activity where a mineral discovery resolves the uncertainty before production begins. In Section 7
. .
~ ~-
-sve assume that the national end°"1ment of managerial services is a random , .
•. · An increase in T has no effect on the Et cut"Ve but shifts the II curve ...
..
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The equilibrium level of K falls, as does the equilibrium level of ~ which falls by more than K -K , the amount by which yN falls.
-An increase in • bas no effect on the EE curve (at the equilibrium ·point) _but shifts the II curve down by H -H • Again the equilibrium level of K falls, as does the equilibrium level of ~ , which falls by more than' H -H , the amount by which .yN falls.
When the threat of expropriation is binding, increases in the inter-. national prices of imported factors have a larger negative effect on national income than otherwise. The reason is that, at higher prices of these factors, only a lower level of compensation of national factors is compatible with competitive ~quilibrium. At a given level of foreign investment, expropriation would be optimal. Renee foreign investment is reduced.
If a penalty (P > 0) is imposed in case of expropriation equation (2.3)
can be modified to
J.n increase in P leaves the II curve unchanged but shifts the EE curve down, increasing foreign investment and national income. Thus a penalty · for expropriation can make a capital importer better off.
Finally we note the distributional consequences of the thTeat of expropriation. For analytic simplicity we assume that the tax implicit in a binding thr£at of expropriation accrues to the government while the three national factors earn their marginal products. In relation to a situation Then ii and i will be chosen so that (3.2)
At an expropriation-constrained equilibrium described by (2.8) and the EE and II curves An increase in the supply of national managerial services, on the other hand, increases income by less than th~ world reward to managerial services, s , which equals the domestic marginal product of managerial services. By reducing reliance on foreign managerial services, an increase in fi reduces the availability of foreign capital. This effect may operate to the extent
In smim.ari, when the threat of expropriation is bind in~ it is optitnal ~o deviat~ from both marginal product and world price rules in investment decisions. As long a~ capital and managers are complements both rules tend to understate the marginal social product of capital and to overstate the tDarginal social p~oduct of managers.
-. Facing.a large number of potential investors, the host would only accept · investment projects yielding zero profits to the investor. ~e now turn to ·· .. ,··.
•.
. the t;ase in which the foreign investor is a monopolist vis-a-vis a large
Dumber of host countries, but remains competitive in world markets for 7 capital and managerial services.
The threat of expropriation nevertheless exists.
As before, if the host country expropriates, it earns an income of
• The monopolistic investor must pay the host country at least this &Jount to preclude expropriation, but has no reason to pay more.
Thus profits are given by
First order conditions for profit maximization imply (4.2) ... -..
For the second-order condition to be satisfied we require that FKK(K,H,L) - . ·.
• .
as an alternative expression for profits. Monopoly profits are the difference between national factor incoi:nes at actual marginal productivities and the marginal productivities that would obtain if expropriation were to occur.
Consider again a penalty P that the host country would suffer if it should expropriate. In this case the host country will receive only , .
. .. . ~
1.
\ .
• .. ' · .'\ , ..
tn Section 2 the threat of expropriation vas sho~ to imply a distortion 1n factor use. Too little capital vas invested by foreigners so that the --economy's capital-labor ratio (K/L) was below the unconstrained optimum.
-Other forms of distortion may be consequences of a thre.at of expropriation.
For instance, Magee (1977) discusses expenditures foreign investors may make to conceal the nature of their production process.
, A very general formulation of this notion is to assume that the fiT'l!'l's profit in the absence of expropriation is given by
where y is a parameter of the production function and C(•) is the cost over the· distortion of technology, in terms of its effects on the welfare of the host country, is analogous to an increase in the penalty P incumbent on the host in the event of default. tinlen potential investors are competitive, the host country benefits from the ability of investors to distort technolo~y.
The abillty of a monopolistic investor to distort technology, however, acts to the host country's detriment.
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pPtimal lnvestment in Risky Projects
Jn Sections 2 to S foreign investment was riskless. J-requently, however, -foreign investors engage in risky activities bearing much of this risk. In ~ ·exprop~iating such activities the host assumes the risk inherent in these activities •
.We assUJDe that domestic production (Q) is given by the f~ction
e is a random variable; in this section we abstract from managerial services. implicitly defines a level of K , denoted tt*rfN> such that K > K* i~plies
Note that K*'(YN) > 0. that expropriation is optimal and not otherwise.
lf expropriation occurs foreign investors will earn profits of (6.4)
.. v assuming, as before, that foreign sources of capital must be paid regardless.
-· .
If expropriation does not occur then prof its are
Firms maximize expected profits.
*
If K is less than K then investsent occurs Until , (6.6) . .
Denote K by the level of K satisfying (6.6).
Competition among investors and taxation of the type discussed in Section 2 will raise YN to the point where . .
investment at a level of K will lead to expropriation and the equilibri\JI!I level of ·~vestment will be constrained.
We depict the resulting equilibrium in Figure 6 
E{U[SF(K,L)]) -U(yN)
are illustrated by the curve EE.
the slope of II is given by ... : .. 
If the host country is risk averse U' is a decreasing function of e and the second term in the far right version of (6.14) is negative. Hence the JI curve shifts up hy more than ~he 'EE curve. yN r.Wes by more than E(6)FL and foreign investment rises. Because an increase .tn L raises the riskiness as well as the level of output the host country is all1.e to accept more capital.
An increase in i or a reduction in T conti:Ilm!.s to increase income.
As in the certainty 1nod.al, this effect is :buger \1hZ!n 'the threat of expropriation.is binding relative to a sit:i;i.atitm aif perfet'll: capital mobility.
i .
'·· ,..
Investment vi.th Stochastic Expropriation
In previous sections we have presented models in which expropriation Dever actually occurs. In a deterministic context, or in a context in which the expropriation decision must occur before any randomness is resolved, ex--propriation can be predicted exactly, and rational, fully-informed investors will not make investments that will be expropriated. .,Nee>
where r is the interest rate paid national capital, w the wage and other ·
•ariables are defined in section 2. The third part of equation (7.1) follows from Euler's theorem and our assumption that national factors receive their marginal products. In contrast to the deterministic case, such payments v.111
exhaust product, as we show below. The profits of foreign firms, if expropriation does not occur, are, as before,
•. .
In the event of expropriation, ho-wever, national income becomes
since it is now possible that fice) > H foT high values of e • This possibility of the host exporting managerial services was ruled out in the deter·1111nistic model of section 2. Profits are silllply, as before,
Expropriation becomes optimal, then, l.lben yE > ~ and not othen.~se. ~ote that both iE and ~ ~re increA~ing in S , and that
i.e., as e rises, e:cJ>ropriation becomes more desirable.
. . *
the value e is defined by the condition . But this result is equivalent to the first order condition of E(TI) with ~espect to K. In a situation of stochastic expropriation, the host need not -impose a tax 1.1f * tK to ensure zero expected profits -the probability of expropriation, a * -e ), plays an analogous role.
Togeth~r (7.8) and (7.lOa), along with r, s, Kand L, determine equilibrium value3 of K, B and e*.
Using FH • s to detennine H implicitly and substituting into (7.8) and * (7.lOb) we obtain two equations in two unknowns, e and K. Relationship (7 .lOb)
gives values of K and e* consistent with zero profits. lJe denote this locus Che 11 curve. If e* c (0,1) the II curve has slope. In general we cannot say in which state income rises more.
Because of this ambiguity-equilibria with higher levels of foreign investment ID8y, ceteris naribus, be associated with a lower probability of expropriation.
Whatever the slope of the EE curve, however, it lies completely to the -right of K for e* < l; at K .. K, YN ~ YE for all values of ~. ·If K .. K, the , host country gains no capital by expropriating but loses its ability to import managerial services. Consequently the threat of expropriation never prohibits foreign investment entirely. --.
The EE and II curves may cross several times as illustrated in Figure 7 .1.
Because e* tends to zero as K tends to infinity, the last intersection of these two curves must have the EE curve cutting the II curve from above.
"The expected value of the host's income, E[Y(0)], is given by (7.13) Using (7.1), (7.8), (7.lOb) and (7.11), it can be shown that
de* II FBH (7.14)
i.e., E(Y) increases along the II curve. We assume, as before, that the host country ensures that the highest intersection of the EE and the II curves is chosen.
-. the local effects of increases in K , L , !(H), r and •-are deter1Dined by the effect of these changes on the positions of the II and EE curves:
First consider an increase in K • The II curve is unaffected while the EE curve shifts up. The equilibrium levels of e* and K rise; i.e., total investment rises and the probability of default declines. As in the preceding models, national capital does not crowd out foreign capital one-for-one.
Secondly, if L increases the II curve shifts dotim (which·follows from
Euler's theorem applied to the marginal products of a constant return to scale production function) while the direction of the shift in the EE curve is ambiguous.
tc Consequently e and K may rise or fall.
·Thirdly, if the distribution of e changes to dominate the original in the first-order sense, i.e., if larger numbers of domestic managers becone more probable, the II curve is unaffected while the EE curve shifts do"1n.
Foreign investment falls and the probability of expropriation, 1 -e*, rises. In section 2 we discussed the implications of 2 binding threat of expropriation on income distribution. ~e now consider the distributional 10 implications of expropriation itself. Of course the effect of expropriation on income distribution depends upon how the income from the expropriated capital is distributed among factors. If expropriation raises national income as a whole this .income can be distriouted in a way which hanns no domestic factor. For analytic: convenience, however, we will assume that income acct"Ues to a fourth party, perhaps the government. First. note that if H(0) > H when expropriation occurs only H mana~ers will be employed domestically. In this case expropriation does not affect the d0tnestic levels of factor use. Hence, for this case, the act of expropriation has no distributional effects since marginal products are unaffected.
. . .
-":·:.. : .-
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. "!·1 . to summarize, an increase in the probability of expropriation, if expropriation does not occur, tends to benefit national capital, harm labor and leave national managers unaffected relative to a situation of perfect capital aobility. If all factors are comple1t1ents expropriation itself will either leave all factors unaffected relative to a situation of no expropriation, or harm capital and labor and benefit managers.
Throughout, we have related the expropriation decision. to' its effect on national income or on the expected ·utility of national income. Authorities controlling the expropriation decision may be motivated more by the effects of expropriation on various sub-groups rather than on the economy as a whole.
~ ~~ension of our analysis would be a reformulation of the expropriation criterion to account for these distributional preferences. . :
. :
. 
Conclusion
It is widely recognized that the threat of expropriation can create departures from perfect capital mobility. This threat bas usuafly, however, ·been treated as an exogenous factor not susceptible of economic analysis.
In this paper we have developed a model of expropriation derived explicitly from utility maximizing behavior on the part of host countries and investors. The extent to 1Jhich a host country is subject to a penalty if it should expropriate actually enhances the welfare of a host country facing comp~titive potential foreign investors when there is no uncertainty about expropriation.
this conclusion is reversed if a foreign investor is in a monopoly position 'Vis-a-vis the host country. If investors are competitive but it is uncertain whether or not expropriation will occur at the time the investment is aade, the effect of an expropriation penalty1118y be ambiguous. As long as 2. ' We assume that in the event of expropriation any asset abroad of the host country will be seized in retaliation. The benefits of expropriation thus depend only upon the ~ capital position.
3. Contrasting the equilibrium t.'here the expropriation threat is bindi~g v:ltb the unconstrained equilibrium, note that the capital-labor ratio is lower in the first situation while the relative magnitude of H/L is higher if capital and management are substitutes but lower if they are complements. Thus, given a productic~ f~!:ti~n, the threat of expropriation distorts factor hiring decisions. In Section S we discuss how the threat of expropriation may cause firms to modify the production function itself. 6. Taxation of foreign capital often takes the form of a requirement that a national of the host country receive a share in the equity of a foreign investment without providing a commensurate share of funds. The host country tnay not necessarily obtain this transfer via legal 111eans. It could·also be effected via bribes, a form of illegal taxation. Foreign ' investors do, apparently, frequently pay bribes to host country officials for th~ right to invest.
7. An alternative assumption is that one investor faces one host leading to a Cournot-Nash or similar game theoretic analysis, a topic vhich we leave ~o possible future analysis. ..
